Day of Infamy ~ Part 3: Foreknowledge and Planning

There is overwhelming evidence that FDR not only knew about the potential for a Japanese attack before it occurred, but also that he did everything in his power to provoke it while assuring that the commanders at Pearl Harbor would not be able to respond adequately, and certainly that no one would be able to prevent or preempt it.

Provocation of Japan

McCollum Memorandum, page 4

On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum submitted a memorandum to the President in which he proposed eight actions designed to provoke Japan into committing “an overt act of war.”  In the course of his four-page memorandum, McCollum presented a brief snapshot of the status quo of the war and America’s current place in it: while “the United States…remain[ed] coolly aloof from the conflict in Europe,” at the time of his writing the U.S. was “committed to a policy of rendering every support short of war” to the allies, especially Great Britain.  Germany, Italy, and Japan were allied such that, should the United States be placed at odds with one of them, it would be at odds with all of the Axis powers.  Likewise, he notes that, in light of America’s close ties with Great Britain, “after England has been disposed of her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States.”  

McCollum’s core argument was that the U.S. could not get involved in the war because intervention was vehemently opposed by the American public; an attack on American soil would be a sure way to change those opinions.  His eight steps included securing the use of British bases in the Pacific and Dutch facilities and supplies in the Dutch East Indies, sending aid to Japan’s enemies in the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek, sending submarines and long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, the Philippines, or Singapore, keeping the main strength of the U.S. Pacific fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, insisting that the Dutch refuse Japanese demands for economic concessions, especially oil, and completely embargoing U.S. and British trade with Japan. His justification: “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”  In essence, McCollum drew the conclusion that the United States should be involved in the war (the validity of his reasoning is debatable), and then proposed a roundabout way to create a cause to declare war.

As outlandish and unthinkable as it seems, McCollum’s plan worked.  Robert Stinnett, a former American sailor who earned ten battle stars and a Presidential Unit Citation, explains in his book, Day of Deceit, that though the steps were not enacted in the exact order outlined in the memorandum, by December of 1941 each of McCollum’s proposed actions had been carried out by FDR (Stinnett, p.10-17).  In his article, “Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised, FDR Was Not,” author and historian James Perloff recounts FDR’s implementation of McCollum’s action plan.  He quotes Secretary of War Henry Stimson as saying in October of 1941, “We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put in the wrong and makes the first bad move—overt move.”  Admiral Edwin T. Layton records that FDR’s goal was to “maneuver [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot”(p.195-196), because, in Stimson’s words, “in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.”

It seems that throughout 1941, FDR’s guiding objective concerning U.S. relations with Japan was provoking this overt act of war.  FDR personally took charge of the heavy cruisers in the Orient; Stinnett says he called the provocations “pop-up” cruises: “I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing.  I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six” (Stinnett, p.9).  Layton recalls when the State Department froze all Axis funds in the United States, which effected a total embargo on all Japanese, German, and Italian trade with the U.S., on July 26.  The New York Times reported the freeze as “the most drastic blow short of war” (Layton, p.121)  Further, on the same day, General Douglas MacArthur was called back to active duty as the commander-in-chief of American forces in the Far East, a move which Layton says acted as a strategic barrier between Japan and the oil resources in the Dutch East Indies.

The Japanese Purple Code

According to Perloff’s research, one of the key elements in America’s foreknowledge of Japan’s intentions was the government’s successful cracking of the “Purple Code,” Japan’s diplomatic code.  The code was so complex that it had to be encrypted and decrypted by a machine, and a team of talented cryptographers was needed to crack the code and create a facsimile of the Japanese code machine; Lieutenant Edwin T. Layton recalls that “the enormous mental effort put Friedman [the lead cryptographer] temporarily in the hospital with a breakdown” (Layton, p.81).  During late 1940 and throughout 1941, a lengthy series of messages was intercepted and decoded by U.S. intelligence officials, and at first they seemed akin to fear-mongering, providing little grounds for concern: “Things are going to happen….” “The breaking out of war may come quickly….”  As time progressed, however, “things” became more serious.  A Japanese naval dispatch on November 26 described the exact method that would be used to attack Pearl Harbor—a specific date was the only missing information. (Perloff)

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